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I. INTRODUCTION
HE conduct of each attorney in our country contributes to the societal perception of our legal system. In light of the recent public
spotlight on our country's criminal justice system in the O.J. Simpson case, attorneys and law students should be increasingly wary of how
their actions are being perceived. Not surprisingly, recent polls tend to
indicate a decline in the trust and confidence that citizens place in attorneys.I In fact, it was recently reported that a stunning 31% of all Ameri2
cans regard lawyers as less honest than the average citizen.
Furthermore, 56% of Americans believe that lawyers use the system to
protect the powerful and enrich themselves. 3 Recently in a Senate debate, Senator Mitch McConnell 4 described our civil justice system as
"broken." 5 Finally, the American tort system was recently described as
"stand[ing] shoulder to shoulder with our welfare system as a leadingsocialpathology.' '6 These figures and statements are upsetting to those who
believe that, for the most part, our system is a fair and efficient one, or at
least that our system is as good as the next alternative.
The most common complaint among lay persons about attorneys is that
1. LESTER BRICKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES 7 (1994).
2. Id. This is not hard to imagine given some legal handbooks have been said to "do
everything but condone outright lying." Stephen Budiansky et al., How Lawyers Abuse the
Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 30, 1995, at 5053, 5056. A mere 11% of the public
has a great deal of "confidence" in law firms. BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 7.
3. Budiansky et al., supra note 2, at 5056.
4. McConnell is a republican Senator from Kentucky.
5. 141 CONG. REC. S3691-05 (daily ed. Mar. 9. 1995) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
6. Lester Brickman, Curb Legal Feeding Frenzy-CaliforniaMeasures Reward Victims
not Lawyers, USA TODAY, Jan. 10, 1996, at 11A (emphasis added).
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they charge too much. 7 Among those who had used an attorney, less
than half the people surveyed believed they were charged a reasonable
fee. 8 With this in mind, attorneys should be particularly mindful of societal disapproval and distaste when setting fees.
Furthermore, because of the attorney's personal stake in the litigation,
contingency fees are especially susceptible to abuse and therefore appropriately scrutinized by the Bar. In a recent survey, it was discovered that
48% of people believed that the only way average people who are injured
can afford a lawyer is on a contingency fee basis. Further, 44% of people
believed that contingency fee contracts encourage too many lawsuits. 9
The charging of excessive fees in general, but particularly of abusive contingency fees, is a subject about which many Americans are deeply concerned. Attorneys should be mindful of this concern over excessive fees
because it directly affects society's perception of the Bar.
Contingency fees are one of the two dominant means of attorney compensation in the United States. 10 Although heralded by some as a citizen's "key to the courthouse,"" in modem times, the contingency fee has
2
undergone critical economic and ethical evaluation by legal scholars.'
This Comment will initially give an expansive overview of the scope,
history, traditionally prohibited uses, and the advantages and disadvantages of the contingency fee. Part III will explore and critique possible
alternatives to the current system, the most notable being the Manhattan
Proposal, a plan authored by three leading scholars on contingency fees.
The final part of this Comment will give an overview of the legislation
which was recently debated in Congress and explain California's Proposition 202, which was placed on the March 1996 state ballot and only narrowly defeated.
Although many journalists have attempted to persuade the public to
the contrary,' 3 personal injury attorneys, operating under the contingency
fee system, are not what is wrong with our system. There may be inadequacies in the current contingency fee system, but the hourly fee system is
not without fault. The problem of excessive and unreasonable fees exists
for plaintiffs and defendants alike. The real problem lies not inherently
7. As one columnist joked, "Nothing is as close to a lawyer's heart as a fat fee, especially a contingency fee." Brent Larkin, Reformers Target Lawyer's Fees, THE PLAIN
DEALER, Feb. 27, 1994, at 1C. Furthermore, the National Law Journalreported that since
its 1986 poll the number of people that believe lawyers overcharge increased from 23% to
43%. Id.
8. BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 7.
9. Budiansky et al., supra note 2, at 5056.
10. Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the ContingentFee, 63 COR.
NELL L. REV. 529 (1978).
11. Philip H. Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Individual's Key to the Courthouse Door,
1976 LrriG. 27 (1975-1976).
12. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 10. Janet A. Laufer, Of Ethics and Economics: Contingent Percentage Fees for Legal Services, 16 AKRON L. REV. 747 (1983).
13. See, e.g., John Stossel, Protect Us From Legal Vultures, THE WALL ST. J., Jan. 2,
1996, at 8; Time for Real Legal Reform is Now, Before Lawyers Bring Nation Down, SUNSENTINEL FT. LAUDERDALE, Jan. 4, 1996, at 14A.
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within either system. Rather, the problem of excessive fees stems from
unscrupulous attorneys on both sides of the Bar who act in their own self
interests when setting and collecting fees. Just as some plaintiffs' attorneys over-estimate the risk involved in a case when setting a contingency
fee, some defense counsel are guilty of padding client bills by logging excessive hours.
This Comment urges that we begin to examine all of the methods that
attorneys have employed to price their services and do so at a careful
pace, without destroying the aspects of our system that have served the
country well over the past several decades. Furthermore, although radical change will not be productive, it is time to start critiquing those aspects of our civil justice system with which the public has long been
dissatisfied. Action needs to be taken soon, before attorneys lose this
ability to self regulate. As the late Justice Frederick Van Pelt Bryan
noted:
When I sit in a settlement part of our court, disposing of large
volumes of negligence litigation including personal injury and death
cases, FELA cases, automobile accident cases, all kinds of cases, and
we get them by the thousands, there are an awful lot of unhappy
clients, bitter clients, clients who leave the court in a state of mind
which is not healthy and which does not presage well for the future
of the Bar. And I tell you that as a fact, that if the Bar does not
police itself very thoroughly, and keep on policing itself very thoroughly, somebody other than the Bar is going to police it, somebody
other than the14Bench is going to police it. And if that occurs, it will
be a sad day.
Unfortunately, the days of self-regulation may soon be over. Recently,
Congress passed amendments to a bill which if passed would have
changed the contingency fee system as we know it if the bill had not been
vetoed by President Clinton. 15 Furthermore, in March 1996, California
voters only narrowly rejected a proposal which would have limited con16
tingency fee recovery in their state.
II.
A.

OVERVIEW OF THE CONTINGENCY FEE

THE BASICS OF THE CURRENT CONTINGENCY FEE SYSTEM

A contingency fee is
[A] fee received for services performed on behalf of a client who is
asserting a claim, payable to the lawyer if, and only if, some recovery
is achieved through the lawyer's efforts. Its distinguishing characteristic is the negative: if no recovery is obtained for his client, the law14. Walter H. Beckham, Jr., Should Contingent Fees in PersonalInjury Cases be SubSEC. INS., NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. REP. 194,214-

ject to Judicial Control?, 1960 A.B.A.
15.

15. See 141 CONG. REC. D515-01 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1995); 141 CONG. REC. D574-02
(daily ed. May 10, 1995).
16. Yumi Wilson, Battle Brewing Over State Lawsuit Initiatives-Triallawyers v. corporate interests, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Jan. 2, 1996, at Al.

1643

THE CONTINGENCY FEE

1996]

yer is not entitled to a fee. 17
The contingent fee is thus predicated on an element of risk, and payment
will only accrue on the "happening of a future event whose occurrence is
8
not readily predictable."'
The contingency fee has also been described as "an arrangement between attorney and client whereby the attorney agrees to represent the
client with compensation to be a percentage of the amount recovered." 19
The typical contingent fee paid by a client ranges from 25% to 50%, depending on the stage of the case at the time of resolution. 20 A limit of
25% generally exists for cases settled before trial.2 1 A fee of one-third or
30% of a judgment is standard for cases tried.2 2 A 40% to 50% fee could
be paid to an attorney if she was required to appeal 23 or undertake other
24
proceedings following judgment.
However, evidence exists which suggests that many attorneys obtain
standard fees of 40% and 50% in cases that are settled before trial. 25 In
these situations "when payments of fees and expenses are taken into account, many clients receive less than 50% of their recoveries even if no
appeals of their judgments are necessary." Several studies have shown
that over half of each dollar expended in litigation is paid in attorney's
fees. 26 When different categories of cases are compared, there are variations in the average amount of fees collected, which hopefully reflects
27
different degrees of risk and effort.
Although the most common type of contingency fee is one which is
based on a percentage of the plaintiff's recovery, there are several other
types of contingency fees. 28 A contingency fee can also be figured by the
hour, meaning that the attorney bills the client for the total hours spent
17. F. B.
18.

MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES
CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 526 (1986).

3 (1964).

19. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 614 (6th ed. 1990).

20. Allison F. Aranson, Note, The United States Percentage Contingent Fee System:
Ridicule and Reform From an InternationalPerspective, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 755, 763 (1992).
21. Robert H. Aronson, Attorney-Client Fee Arrangements: Regulation and Review,
1980 WL 30111, at *30 (F.J.C. 1980).
22. Henry H. Drummonds, The Law and Ethics of Percentage Contingent Fees in Oregon, 72 OR. L. REV. 859, 860 (1993).
23. Note, however, that in the absence of an express provision concerning the appellate process, the courts have held that a contract for legal services implicitly includes work
done on appeals, and that the attorney is not entitled to additional compensation for such
work. See Aronson, supra note 21, at *30.
24. Id. at *2.
25. BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 14.
26. 141 CONG. REC. S5857-06 (daily ed. May 1, 1995).
27. Stewart Jay, The Dilemmas of Attorney Contingent Fees, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
813 (1989). For example, "asbestos cases closed between 1980 and 1982 had average fees
and costs of 39%; major aviation accident death cases were below 30% (data from ongoing
research in 1986); automobile accident cases (1978 data) were 31%; medical malpractice
came to 36% (data from early 1970s)." Id. at 830.
28. Id. at 814. But cf id. at 821 (few if any personal injury attorneys offer any of the
other types of contingency agreements as options for fee payment).
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on the case only if the representation has been successful. 29 Another alternative is to compensate the attorney hourly and with a bonus, both

based upon the outcome of the litigation. 30 A lawyer could also specify a

flat fee for services, which would be payable contingent on a positive outcome. 31 Finally, an attorney could be compensated at a flat hourly rate
with a bonus granted in the event of a positive outcome. 32 These various
alternatives to the percentage contingency fee have advantages and disadvantages; unfortunately, none have been adequately explored because

the percentage contingency fee is 33
the dominant method of financing litigation in certain areas of the law.
B.

HISTORY OF THE CONTINGENCY FEE

The United States has fully embraced the contingent fee system as an
acceptable and, for the most part, desirable way of contracting for legal

services. 3 4 Every state in the country has accepted the contingency fee as

a practical and perfectly legal way for an attorney to provide legal serv-

ices. 35 However, Maine had maintained its traditional ban on the use of

the contingency fee until 1965.36

Although now viewed in the United States as commonplace, the contingency fee is used in only two other countries: Spain and parts of Canada. 37 Contingent fee systems are prohibited in Great Britain and
English Commonwealth nations. While this prohibition has been maintained for a variety of reasons, the original rationale behind its proscription centered around the medieval doctrines of maintenance, champerty,
and barratry. 38 The Doctrine of Champerty prohibits the agreement on
"a suit in exchange for the promise of a share in the recovery. '' 39 Contingent percentage fees violate the doctrines of maintenance and champerty
40
because the attorney is maintaining the client until an award is received.
In addition to these medieval doctrines, England has, unlike the United
29. Id. at 814. See also Alfred D. Youngwood, The Contingent Fee-A Reasonable Alternative, 28 MOD. L. REV. 330, 333 (1965).
30. Jay, supra note 27, at 814.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Wylie v. Coxe, 56 U.S. 415 (1853) (Supreme Court first recognized contingent
fee contracts by permitting plaintiff's attorney to recover a contingent fee of 5% on the
amount recovered on the client's claim against a foreign government); Taylor v.Bemiss,
110 U.S. 42 (1884) (Supreme Court held that a contingent fee that constitutes 50% of a
client's recovery is not extortionate); Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 557 (1876) (Court
approved the use of a contingent fee in a claim against the United States).
35. Jay, supra note 27, at 813.
36. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 527.
37. Corboy, supra note 11, at 30.
38. Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48, 59-61 (1935). Maintenance is defined as "an officious intermeddling by a party who has no interest in the
suit." BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 286 (3d ed. 1991).
39.

MACKINNON,

supra note 17, at 36-38.

40. Radin, supra note 38, at 70.
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States, traditionally viewed litigation as undesirable.4 1 "Courts lumped
the contingent fee in with other champertous practices that were thought
to stir up unwanted litigation and involve unscrupulous lawyers in the
'42
nefarious business of brokering lawsuits.
Finally, another probable reason contingent fees have not been
adopted in Great Britain involves the widespread availability of publicly
financed legal aid. The Legal Aid Scheme in England is administered by
the Law Society and is underwritten by the government.4 3 The English
Legal Aid Committee screens clients to ensure that the client has a reasonable claim and his financial resources are indeed limited. 44 If the client meets these requirements, the solicitor is given authorization to take
the case and the Legal Aid Scheme agrees to pay a percentage of the
client's costs; the percentage will depend on the client's particular financial status.4 5 However, Legal Aid will not assist in claims involving defa46
mation, seduction, breach of promise to marry, or enticement.
It is interesting to note that although generally adverse to the use of the
contingency fee, modern England has considered reversing the prohibition for the disadvantaged.4 7 Furthermore, amidst the controversy in the
United States, the Canadian province of Ontario very recently decided to
end its long-standing prohibition against the use of the contingency fee.48
Interestingly enough, Ontario's Attorney General, Charles Harnick, explained the primary motivation behind the change as a need to provide
indigent clients access to the legal system.4 9 This is exactly the reason
why many Americans are hesitant about radically changing our own con50
tingency fee system.
The American practice of using contingency fees originated in the industrial age when large numbers of industrial and transportation accident
41. Corboy, supra note 11, at 30-31. Corboy notes four differences between the American and English system:
[A]lthough its participants are entitled to do things in their own way, 1) Their
adversary system is far less "adverse" than ours and depends heavily on
shared values and contentment with the status quo in English society; 2) their
courts have not become the means to social justice as they have become in
large measure here and that the isolation of the [B]ar is a cause of that situation; 3) their lawyers exercise too little independence in their practice; and 4)
their litigants receive too little of the protection we have come to expect from
representation by legal counsel.
Id.
42. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 527.

43. Youngwood, supra note 29, at 334.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 335.
47. See David R. Getto, Letters to the Editor: English Rule no substitute for Justice,
DET. NEWS, Feb. 9, 1996, at A8.
48. Barry Brown, Ontario Will Allow Lawyers to Collect Contingency Fees, BUF.
NEWS, Jan. 2, 1996, at A5; Contingency Legal Fees Fund Justice, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Jan. 5,
1996, at A13.
49. Contingency Legal Fees Fund Justice, supra note 48, at A13.
50. Stacey Ruckle, 'Average Guy' Doesn't Want Reform, Lawyer Says, CHARLESTON
DAILY MAIL, Feb. 8, 1996, at 01A.
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victims could not afford legal representation to pursue their personal injury claims. 5 1 Without an attorney willing to take on such risky cases,
many of those persons injured during this economic boom period would

not have been able to sue to recover damages for their work-related injuries. 52 The principal use of contingency fees has continued to be in the
personal injury arena.53 The contingency fee has proven particularly
well-suited to the situation where an individual has been injured and
desires to sue on the basis of the injury, but is unable to afford representation precisely because of the injury.5 4
In addition to personal injury cases, the contingency fee has been employed in class actions, collection matters, antitrust actions, shareholder
derivative suits, corporate reorganizations, tax proceedings, condemnation actions, will contest litigation, debt collections, environmental actions, civil rights claims (including employment discrimination), and

stockholders' suits. 55 Further innovative use of the contingency fee has
included use in defending tort claims, lien foreclosures, and ejectment
suits. 56 Also, combinations of hourly, fixed, and contingent fees have re-

cently become popular in business and law firms as part of the move to57
ward "value billing."

C.

TRADITIONAL AREAS OF CONTINGENCY FEE PROHIBITION

Despite its general acceptance, American courts have proscribed the
use of the contingent fee in certain situations on public policy grounds.
These areas include domestic relations,5 8 criminal defense, 59 and legislative litigation. 60
51. Jay, supra note 27, at 815.
52. Corboy, supra note 11, at 29. See also Clermont & Currivan, supra note 10, at 531;
MURRAY T. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 140-41 (1968) (describing contingent
fees as almost the exclusive method of financing personal injury litigation).
53. Corboy, supra note 11, at 28. See also Clermont & Currivan, supra note 10, at 531;
BLOOM. supra note 52.
54. Corboy, supra note 11, at 28. "The contingent fee did not blossom forth into anything approaching its present use until the industrial revolution with its concomitant of
industrial accidents and poor plaintiffs." Youngwood, supra note 29, at 332.
55. Corboy, supra note 11, at 29.
56. Eric M. Rhein, Judicial Regulation of Contingent Fee Contracts, 48 J. AIR L. &
COM. 151, 158 (1982).
57. Drummonds, supra note 22, at 900 n.22.
58. However, the prohibition against contingent fee systems in this area has been relaxed somewhat in recent years. See Kathleen P. Southern, Comment, Professional Responsibility-ContingentFees in Domestic Relations Actions: Equal Freedom to Contractfor
the Domestic Relations Bar, 62 N.C. L. REV. 381 (1984); see Note, Contingent Fee Contracts: Contract Related to Divorce Action Upheld, 56 MINN. L. REV. 979 (1972).
59. Eric W. Lam, Comment, Toward a Valid Defense ContingentFee Contract:A Comparative Analysis, 67 IowA L. REV. 373, 374 (1982).
60. Some courts have also proscribed the use of contingent fees for purposes of influencing legislative or administrative action. See Weehawken Realty Co. v. Hass, 177 A. 434
(N.J. 1935).
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1. Domestic Relations
The predominant rationale cited for the prohibition of the contingent
fee in the domestic relations context is the state's interest in maintaining
the marriage relationship. 61 The idea is that contingent fee arrangements
might tend to encourage the lawyer to discourage reconciliation of the
parties. 62 For this reason, the American Bar Association has stated that
"contingent fee arrangements in domestic relations cases are rarely justified."' 63 However, in some states this limitation does not apply to postdivorce actions. 64 In these states, contingent fee contracts to collect child
65
support funds from a divorced spouse are permitted.
2.

Criminal Defense

The use of the criminal contingency fee has also been historically
viewed as against public policy. 66 This result is largely due to the early
comments of the most influential author on contingency fees, F.B. MacKinnon. 67 MacKinnon cited three cases 68 and a "consensus" among unidentified commentators as standing for the proposition that the practice
69
of using contingency fees in criminal cases was against public policy.
This limitation on contingency fees being employed in criminal cases has
survived. Today, practically every jurisdiction has outlawed the use of
contingency fees in such cases, and both the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility prohibit their
use.70 An attorney's breach of this obligation can lead to professional
71
discipline and contractual liability.
61. ProfessionalResponsibility-Contingent Fees in Domestic Relations Actions: Equal
Freedom to Contractfor the Domestic Relations Bar, supra note 58, at 383.
62. See Contingent Fee Contracts: Contract Related to Divorce Action Upheld, supra
note 58, at 980.
63. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (1980).
64. Guenard v. Burke, 443 N.E.2d 892, 895 (1982) (prohibiting any contingent fee
agreement in a domestic relations case entered into prior to entry of a final divorce
decree).
65. See Feature, Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics, 79 MASS. L. REV.
89 (1994).
66. Peter Lushing, The Falland Rise of the Criminal Contingent Fee, 82 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 498, 503 (1991).
67. MACKINNON, supra note 17, at 52.

68. Weber v. Shay, 46 N.E. 377 (Ohio 1897); Peyton v. Margiotti, 156 A.2d 865 (Pa.
1959); Bac v. Padilla, 190 P. 730 (N.M. 1920).
69. Lushing, supra note 66, at 503-07.
70. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) (1980); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(d)(2) (Discussion Draft 1983).

71. Id. The evolution of our criminal justice system adds another dimension to MacKinnon's early analysis, whose comments about the subject basically dictated the then-existing state of the law. Perhaps, MacKinnon would not necessarily be adverse to the use of
the contingency fee system in a modern world where a system of community funding has
sometimes failed to provide equal justice. MacKinnon states,
Current developments in the use of public defenders, court appointed and
compensated counsel, and legal aid for criminal defendants indicate that economic pressures currently point toward a fee arrangement borne by the community and not by the individual client.
MACKINNON, supra note 17, at 53.
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Given the changes that have occurred in our legal system, it might be
time to reexamine the cursory treatment that the idea of criminal defense
contingency fee contracts received by MacKinnon. However, there are
still four main justifications for the modern prohibition of contingency fee
contracts in criminal law. Prominent concerns have included: (1) the nature of fee collection for criminal defense attorneys; (2) attorney/client
conflicts of interest; (3) lack of a monetary recovery; and (4) immorality
of the Bar.
3. Lobbying
Finally, lawyers traditionally have been unable to contract with clients
on a contingency basis to perform activities such as passage of legislation
or the awarding of a government contract. 72 Recently, a bill was introduced in Congress that would put teeth into this common law prohibition
by making contingent fee contracts to influence government actions a
crime under Federal law. 73 The penalty for this crime would be a fine of
$100,000 or up to five years imprisonment, or both. 74 In addition, the law
would authorize the Attorney General to bring a civil suit against the
attorney and recover an amount equal to twice the proceeds that the con75
tingency fee generated.
D.

ADVANTAGES

OF THE CONTINGENCY FEE

There are many advantages to the contingent fee system, and before
demonstrating the weaknesses in the system, I will highlight these positive aspects. First, the role that contingency fees play in providing indigent clients access to the legal system cannot be ignored. 76 Next, it is
important to recognize that the contingent fee represents the essence of
freedom to contract. In effect, what the client is able to do, via the contingency fee, is contract away part of his legal claim. 77 In addition, one of
the earliest recognized benefits of the contingent fee was its inherent linking of the attorney's interests with those of the client.78 Finally, the contingency fee has produced safer products by giving the poorest of clients
the ability to haul even the largest of companies into court for producing
a defective product.7 9
72. Youngwood, supra note 29, at 332.
73. 141 CONG. REC. S173-01, S277 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Thurmond).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Corboy, supra note 11, at 32.
77. Note, Contingent Fee Contracts: Validity, Controls, and Enforceability, 47 IOWA L.
REV. 942, 943 (1962).
78. Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-InjuryLitigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1970).
79. Corboy, supra note 11, at 29.
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Provides Access to the Legal System for the Disadvantaged

The most common justification for the use of the contingent fee system
is that the system provides counsel for many who would not be able to
pay a fixed fee for a competent lawyer.8 0 As one commentator noted
long ago, "[D]espite its widespread use in the United States the contingent fee is, nevertheless, viewed in many if not most American quarters
as a necessary evil." 8 1 As discussed earlier, the contingent fee gained tremendous popularity during the industrial revolution. Cases during that
era often involved a poor factory worker suing a large company. Without
a contingency fee system, the resources and power of a large corporate
defendant would likely frighten most potential plaintiffs away from investing large sums of money in litigation. 82 As stated by Max Radin in
his 1935 essay, "If in medieval England, powerful men oppressed their
weaker fellow subjects by maintaining suits against them, in modern society powerful people are more likely to achieve their ends by daring their
victims to maintain suits." '83 Now, by simply being able to hire an attorif the
ney, the client is likely to receive a higher offer from the defendant
85
case settles 8 4 and better representation if the case goes to trial.
In effect, what the contingency fee attorney does is lend the plaintiff
the funds to enable her to pursue a claim. 86 To the extent that it is financially necessary for a potential plaintiff to obtain such a loan to proceed in
a lawsuit, there is probably no other available method within our society
for financing the claim. 87 It is not likely that institutional lenders would
claim as collateral, given the inherent risks
be interested in using a legal
88
associated with litigation.
Most people believe that, to the extent contingent fees give the poor
and middle class greater access to the courts, contingency fees are a use80. Id. at 32; Jay, supra note 27, at 813. See also Barry J. Nace, The 'Legal Scholars'
Speak on Contingency Fees, 1994 TRIAL 7.
81. Youngwood, supra note 29, at 333. He continues, "[P]ractically all American lawyers would agree ... contingent fees are generally allowed in the United Sates because of
their practical value in enabling the poor man with a meritorious cause of action to obtain
competent counsel." Id. at 334.
82. Although the ABA Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility prohibits such practice, some believe that to give an indigent true access to the courts he should be able to
contract on a contingent basis with expert witnesses. Reed E. Schaper, The Contingent
Compensation of Expert Witnesses in Civil Litigation, 52 IND. L.J. 671 (1977); Note, Contingent Fees for Expert Witnesses in Civil Litigation, 86 YALE L.J. 1680 (1977); but cf MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109 (1980) (prohibiting lawyer from paying a witness a fee that is contingent upon the content of his testimony or the outcome of
the case).
83. Radin, supra note 38, at 77-78.
84. John Fleming, The Contingent Fee and Its Effect on American Tort Law, in BUTTERWORTH LECTURES, at 50, 55 (1989).
85. Id.
86. See Jay, supra note 27, at 814.
87. Id.
88. Id. "Banks, lacking assignable security, thus cannot justify lending funds for legal
fees on the unsecured hope that a statistical likelihood of recovering will pay off the loan."
WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 528.
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ful part of our legal system. 89 The problem many have with contingency
fees is, instead, that lawyers are making excessive amounts of money in
the name of serving the poor. 90 As stated in a recent Senate debate, "the
lawyers are using this process not so much to ...protect the little guythe little guy is the person who is actually hurt-but rather to earn a
living which is far beyond what is necessary to protect the public." 9 1
2.

Supports Policy of Allowing Citizens Freedom to Contract

In a competitive market, an efficient allocation of resources will be
achieved when individuals are permitted to reach mutually acceptable
agreements. Thus, the argument follows that if attorney and client are
both comfortable with a contingent fee arrangement, restrictions on the
ability to so contract should not be imposed. Interfering with the contingency fee contract will disrupt the efficient allocation of resources
throughout society. 92 Many courts have endorsed this position, feeling
that, absent evidence of fraud or overreaching, the attorney-client con93
tract for legal services should not be intruded upon by the State.
There are three problems with the freedom of contract argument.
First, the argument assumes that the attorney and client have agreed on
the amount of the contingent percentage after negotiation. 94 Typically,
however, there is little if any negotiation between the attorney and the
client concerning an appropriate percentage amount for a contingency
fee.9 5 Instead, the client is told that the "standard" or normal way the
attorney bills is by a one-third contingency fee, and the client merely accepts this. 96 Second, the argument ignores the fact that the attorney-client relationship has traditionally been subject to heavy regulation by the
courts and various professional associations. 97 Finally, the freedom of
contract argument is also problematic because it assumes that the client
has access to enough information to make an intelligent decision. In reality, most clients have very little knowledge about how the legal market
operates and have had little contact with the legal system.98

89. See generally Ruckle, supra note 50, at 01A (arguing that efforts to modify the
contingency fee ignores the basic role contingency fees play in providing access to the
courts to low and middle income persons).
90. 141 CONG. REC. S5857-06, 5858 (daily ed. May 1, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
91. Id.
92. Contingent Fee Contracts: Validity, Controls, and Enforceability, supra note 77, at
943.
93. Rhein, supra note 56, at 166.
94. Id. at 167.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. Peter H. Shuck, Consumer Ignorance and Legal Advertising, 43 INS. COUNS. J. 568
(1976).
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3. Alignment of Attorney/Client Interests
Often contingency fees are justified on the ground that by making the
recovery of a large judgment a win-win situation, the attorney's and client's interests become aligned. 99
The problem with this argument is that it is too general. An attorney's
interests are generally aligned with the client's because the common goal
is to extract a large settlement or verdict from the defendant. The interests diverge, however, because the attorney maximizes her net profit by
working as few hours as possible to reach this large result, whereas the
client wants the attorney to work as many hours as necessary to attain
this goal. 10 0
4.

Promotes ProgressiveLitigation

Besides the access to the judicial process that the contingent fee provides for certain individuals, commentators have also pointed to the
wealth of progressive consumer litigation that has occurred during recent
years as a byproduct of the contingency fee. 1 1 As one scholar noted,
"During the past several decades, cases brought only because the mechanism of the contingent fee was available have succeeded in overturning a
considerable body of backward-looking law."'10 2 In fact, it has been estimated that 90% to 95% of the progressive decisions made during recent
years have been the result of contingent fee litigation. 10 3 Examples of
progressive changes made in the law credited to the use of the contingency fee include:
[A]bolition of governmental immunity in some states, abrogation of
intra-family immunity, the creation of a wife's right to recover for
negligent impairment of her husband's consortium, the creation of
the tort of negligent infliction of emotional, distress, and the right of
parents to recover for the wrongful death of an unborn child. 10 4
Florida Bar President, John A. Devault III explains, "People are no
longer being maimed by flammable children's pajamas, Dalkon shields,
asbestos-laden new homes and cars that explode on impact because cli'1 °5
ents asked lawyers to advocate for them. 0
An abolition of the contingency fee system would certainly have serious long-term consequences for human rights, values, and safety.' 0 6 Because litigation appears so risky to potential plaintiffs, "particular areas of
99. Note, The Contingent Fee: DisciplinaryRule, Ethical Consideration,or Free Competition?, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 547, 550. See also Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 78, at
1125; Paul D. Carrington, Comment, The Right to Zealous Counsel, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1291,
1293.
100. See infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
101. Corboy, supra note 11, at 29.
102. Id.
103. T. Lambert, The Trial Lawyers and the Changing Law, 7 TRIAL, July/Aug. 1971.
104. Rhein, supra note 56, at 158.
105. Mediation Alternative to Court, SUN-SENTINEL FT. LAUDERDALE, Feb. 4, 1996, at
4G.
106. Corboy, supra note 11, at 29.
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the law might develop far less vigorously, especially areas in nascent
stages.' 10 7 Furthermore, the mere threat of a lawsuit provides some assurance that companies will be mindful of health and safety when designing and producing their products. 10 8
Although it is true that high profile cases in modem times have helped
to keep some harmful, dangerous products out of the market, there is a
flip side to this benefit. There are also many products, perhaps safer and
more effective products, that have not reached store shelves because
manufacturers are afraid of the inevitable lawsuit.' 0 9 In fact, it is estimated that this fear of liability prompted 47% of businesses to withdraw
products from the marketplace, 25% to discontinue some forms of research, and 8% to lay off employees. 110 In his address to the Senate,
Senator Spencer Abraham"1 also noted the number of small businesses,
one out of five, that decide not to introduce a new product because of a
fear of litigation." 2 He also discussed the increasingly common problem
of pharmaceutical companies discontinuing helpful, but litigation suscep113
tible, drugs.
A recent Wall Street Journal article also highlighted the problem when
it noted that a liability premium of $100 has been added to the cost of
making a modem football." 4 Furthermore, although America once had
twenty major vaccine producers, only four remain because of excessive
litigation." 5 The author explained, "Fear of suits has reduced our access
to all kinds of good things: small airplanes, public swimming pools, [and]
honest job references."' 16
E.

PROBLEMS

&

CRITICISMS OF THE CURRENT CONTINGENCY

FEE SYSTEM

As discussed, many people, both lawyers and non-lawyers, are finding
fault with the legal system lately. In this rush to "fix" the system, contingency fees have became an easy reform target. But, aside from political
agendas, it cannot be denied that there are serious problems with the way
that the contingent fee operates in modern America. First, although the
contingency fee would work in a perfect economic world, in the real
world the client does not have access to enough information about attorney's fees. 1 7 The effect of this lack of information is that many clients
have not freely decided that the contingent fee is the best payment ar107. Jay, supra note 27, at 815 (securities law is used as an example of one area of law
that has developed largely due to contingency fees).
108. See Ruckle, supra note 50, at 01A.
109. 141 CONG. REC. S5857-06, 5858 (daily ed. May 1, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
110. 141 CONG. REC. S3767-02 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
111. Abraham is a republican Senator from Michigan.
112. 141 CONG. REC. S3767-02 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
113. Id.
114. Stossel, supra note 13, at 8.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Shuck, supra note 98, at 568.
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rangement for them, but instead have been told that the agreement is the
standard way in which such cases are handled. 118 Next, although at a
superficial level the contingent fee aligns the attorney's financial interests
with those of the client's, more careful examination has shown that the
contingent fee attorney actually has an incentive to generate the highest

return possible while expending the least amount of effort necessary.119
In other words, the attorney is interested in the highest net return. The
client, on the other hand, wants the attorney to put in as much effort as
necessary to produce the highest return possible. In addition, many attorneys receive excessive contingent fees in comparison with the amount of
work or effort required to produce the outcome.' 20 It has also been argued that the contingent fee encourages frivolous lawsuits because an attorney will subsidize high risk, frivolous suits with funds from low risk,
big settlement cases. 12 '
Another concern with the operation of the contingency fee in modern
society is that attorneys are not varying the percentage rate charged in
accordance with the amount of risk a particular case presents. Finally,
opponents criticize contingency fee attorneys for their blanket approach
to client financing needs. It is argued that the rationale of providing the
disadvantaged with access to the legal system does not support allowing
wealthy clients to use the contingency fee.
1. Freedom to Contract Argument Assumes Client Has Access to
Market Information About Legal Fees
As one commentator noted, "The great majority of consumers of legal
services who agree to contingent fee arrangements lack the ability to
gauge accurately whether a projected recovery will exceed litigation expenses.' 122 Although a pure economic model suggests that constructing
barriers for attorneys and clients who want to use a contingency fee payment arrangement is economically dangerous, this economic model assumes that consumers and clients have adequate information concerning
the legal market. However, when surveyed by the American Bar Foundation, 80% of persons said they did not go to lawyers "because they
cannot identify which particular lawyer is competent to handle their particular problem."'1 23 Furthermore, the American Bar Foundation study
found that "75% of the persons polled overestimated the cost of a 1/2hour consultation, and that 40% overestimated the cost by as much as
300%."124 Thus, the general public is generally unable to accurately evaluate a legal claim and therefore, must rely on the lawyer's assessment of
the case.
118. See Rhein, supra note 56, at 167.

119. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 10, at 534.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

John F. Grady, Some Ethical Questions About PercentageFees, 1976 LING. 20, 24.
Aranson, supra note 20, at 762.
Jay, supra note 27, at 815.
Shuck, supra note 98, at 568.
ld.
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This lack of information places the consumer in a vulnerable position
with regard to the attorney because she is not in a position to bargain
effectively to determine an appropriate fee arrangement. As noted by
one legal commentator, "The potential for abuse is of particular concern
in those relationships that are not expected to be ongoing, which is usually the situation when a person brings a personal injury claim to a lawyer
1 25
who specializes in such cases."'
The client suffers from lack of information because the attorney censors the information he provides to the client about her claim based on
what the attorney believes is important for the client to know. 126 This is
problematic for two reasons. First, this is troublesome because a large
part of the decision to contract for legal services by method of contingency fee should ideally involve a client's preferences for risk. 127 If the
lawyer attempts to substitute his judgment on the amount of risk that is
acceptable, the client has been denied his ability to voluntarily decline the
contingent fee contract. 128 Second, the lawyer, as discussed above, is not
a neutral advisor, and therefore is not an appropriate figure to determine
what information a client does and does not need to have. 12 9 One commentator explains, "Attorneys are free to exaggerate the complexity of
130
the case.'
One commentator suggests that consumers could become more informed about the legal market if attorneys increased their advertising and
Bar associations provided public information about attorneys' fees and
quality of work.' 3 ' However, another commentator questions the practicality of this alternative and suggests that legal problems are inherently
too unique to provide a standard consumer rate and quality analysis. 32
2. Contingency Fee Does Not Align Attorney/Client Interests
At first glance, the contingency fee seems to align the attorney's interests with that of the client. And to some extent, that is clearly true. Obviously, both the client and the contingent fee attorney have the same
general interest in the outcome in the case. 133 However, the contingent
fee does not necessarily lead an attorney to devote the amount of time
and effort to a case that would maximize the client's net return. 3 4
If a particular number of hours of work would result in the largest net
recovery for the client, the client desires the attorney to work that
125. Jay, supra note 27, at 818.
126. See Cassandra Burrell, Committee Hears Debate on Whether to Limit Lawyers'
Contingency Fees, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 7, 1995.
127. Jay, supra note 27, at 821.
128. Id.

129. Id.
130. Burrell, supra note 126.
131. Michael A. Dover, Contingent Percentage Fees: An Economic Analysis, 51 J. AIR
L. & COM. 531, 564-65 (1986).
132. Drummonds, supra note 22, at 868.
133. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 10, at 536.
134. Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 78, at 1144-145.
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amount of hours. However, the lawyer has no direct economic incentive
to work that particular number of hours because her goal is to get the
largest amount of recovery in the shortest amount of time. 135 "Lawyers
on contingent fee are said to have an incentive to make a 'quick kill'
before too many additional hours are spent at possibly only a marginal
increase in the lawyer's fee."'1 36 Thus, the contingent fee system can cre-

ate an incentive for an attorney to deprive the client of the right to make

her own decisions in litigation, such as when to settle a claim. 137 The
lawyer and the client have the same interests only when the case goes to
the jury; before that time the attorney actually has a strong incentive to
settle the case, which could be in conflict with the plaintiff's best
38
interests.1
3.

Excessive Fees Bear No Relation to Work Performed

Because the attorney and the client enjoy a fiduciary relationship, there
are special problems inherent in the calculation of legal fees. As one
legal scholar commented, "Unlike the seller of goods or other kinds of
services, a lawyer is prohibited
by the canons of his profession from mak139
ing an excessive charge."'
Although attorneys are prohibited from charging these judicially determined "clearly excessive fees," oftentimes the fees that attorneys working
on a contingency fee basis collect seem to shock the conscience of the
general public and the rest of the legal community. 40 As Professor Lester Brickman points out, "the contingency fee is the key to the courthouse for injured plaintiffs, but it also has become the key to untold
riches for lawyers.' 14' In fact, it is estimated that the contingency fee
system generates around $15 billion a year for lawyers. 142 Furthermore,
it is estimated by Professor Brickman that many trial attorneys earn
$1000 to $25,000 per hour. 143
135. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 10, at 534; Aranson, supra note 20, at 755.
136. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 529.
137. Id. at 536. See also Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 78, at 1133-135 (discussing
how contingency system rewards fast, cheap settlements). The effect is for the lawyer to
treat the client as his or her own "key to the courthouse door." Theresa A. Gabaldon, Free
Riders and the Greedy Gadfly: ExaminingAspects of Shareholder Litigationas an Exercise
in Integrating Ethical Regulation and Laws of GeneralApplicability, 73 MINN. L. REV. 425,
466 (1988).
138. Aranson, supra note 20, at 764. In addition, there is also a case management rationale for the lawyer desiring to settle. Id. The attorney can handle a large number of
contingent fee cases and maximize his returns by settling many of them, versus spending
much of their time going to court for one case, which may or may not produce income. Id.
139. Grady, supra note 120, at 20.
140. Id. at 24-25.
141. Brickman, supra note 6, at 11A.
142. Place Some Limits on Contingency Fees, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 8, 1994, at
BIO. In addition, asbestos litigation is estimated to generate more than $1 billion a year.
Budiansky et al., supra note 2, at 5056.
143. Taming Runaway Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1995, at A22.
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The Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides eight factors
which should be considered in determining whether a legal fee is
reasonable:
* The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal
services properly.
" The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of
the particular employment will preclude other employment by
the lawyer.
" The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services.
* The amount involved and the results obtained.
* The time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances.
• The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client.
" The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services.
* Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 144
Critics of contingency fees complain that although these factors might be
examined in determining whether to bill the client on an hourly or contingent basis, 145 there is no relation between the ultimate fee and the degree
of diligence exercised by an attorney. In fact, one study indicates that a
lawyer working on a contingent fee basis works, on average, seven hours
46
less on a case than a lawyer hired on an hourly basis.'
Although there are admitted differences in the level of skills from attorney to attorney, such differences rarely create differences in the size of
a plaintiff's verdict.' 47 The differential in verdicts is more likely created
by the nature and extent of a plaintiff's injuries.' 48 Whether an attorney
should receive higher compensation because her client has worse injuries
than another attorney's client is questionable, provided no more than av49
erage work is involved.'
However, it is important to point out that not all studies indicate that
contingent fee attorneys recover excessive fees; in fact, one study showed
that lawyers on average actually earn about as much from contingency
fee cases as they do when they are paid by the hour.' 50
Furthermore, plaintiffs attorney's often rebut the argument that they
receive excessive fees by pointing to the contingent nature of a contingent
144. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.5 (Discussion Draft 1993).

145. This is actually sharply disputed.
146. Herbert M. Kritzer et al., The Impact of Fee Arrangement on Lawyer Effort, 19
LAW & Soc'y REv. 251, 272 (1985).
147. Grady, supra note 120, at 21.
148. Id. "Juries award money to compensate for injuries, and as a general rule, the
worse the injury the larger the verdict." Id.
149. Id. Grady also questions the multiple plaintiff situation. In this case the attorney
represents many people injured in the same accident and receives a portion of each settlement or judgment even though the work done was essentially that for one case. Id.
150. Burrell, supra note 126.
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fee to explain the fees they collect. 15 1 Judge Richard Posner describes the
contingent fee as a type of interest rate. 152 His explanation for the large
contingent fees is that "this interest rate must be high because the risk of
1 53
default is high."'
Theoretically, an attorney working under a contingent fee system could
spend many hours on a case only to lose at trial and recover nothing.
However, because most cases settle before trial, the modern contingency
fee generally does not reflect the actual risk of non-recovery that the attorney incurs. 154 "In reality, however, the attorney handling a personal
55
injury case incurs little risk of default."'
One judge estimated that an attorney should easily be able to prepare
for and present a case within thirty hours.' 56 Furthermore, Professor
Brickman indicates that in 25% to 35% of cases "lawyers get a contingency even though there's no 'contingency' in their work.' 57 Finally,
there are also situations where an attorney represents multiple plaintiffs
and, although doing work that is common to all of their claims, she
158
charges each a contingent fee.
However much greater the chances of settlement are in modern times,
the efforts of plaintiffs' attorneys should not be discounted. "Tort litigation, including preparation and negotiations in advance of litigation, typically involves substantial uncertainties in the theory and proof of liability,
1 59
defenses, damages, and potential collectibility."'
Another argument that plaintiffs' attorneys typically make is that,
although the case at hand might not be very risky, it is necessary to make
a profit on these low-risk cases in order to be able to fund high-risk litigation. Justice Scalia recently acknowledged this practice when writing,
"An attorney operating on a contingency-fee basis pools the risks
presented by his various cases: cases that turn out to be successful pay for
the time he gambled on those that did not.' 160 In his treatise on legal
ethics, one legal commentator used the ability to cross-subsidize risk as a
benefit of the contingency fee system.' 6' He explained, "With a portfolio
of clients whose claims bear varying degrees of risk, a lawyer can use a
high-percentage recovery in one case to support work on other cases, including those that will turn out to be losers."' 62
151. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Colman, Letters to the Editor: Anti-Lawyer, Pro-Big Business, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1996, at A13.
152. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 448-49 (1977).
153. Laufer, supra note 12, at 751.
154. Aranson, supra note 20, at 764.
155. Laufer, supra note 12, at 751.
156. Grady, supra note 120, at 21.
157. Taming Runaway Lawyers, supra note 143, at A22.
158. Grady, supra note 120, at 21-22.
159. Drummonds, supra note 22, at 863-64.
160. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 565 (1992).
161. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 528.
162. Id.
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But the ethics of this "pooling" approach are open to debate. A lawyer
owes a fiduciary duty to a client to zealously represent her interests. To
the extent that a particular attorney is motivated to benefit people other
than the client during representation, the attorney has breached the fiduciary duty. Sharply disputing the ethics of the "pooling" approach, one
legal scholar comments,
A license to practice law does not justify, in effect, taking more of a
client's recovery than the particular case justifies and diverting that
money to the cases of other clients whose claims are less worthy.
The reasonableness of a contingent fee should instead be measured
163
by the risks, effort, and results in each client's particular case.
However, financing legal services for the indigent in this manner is perhaps preferable to the next best alternative. Professor Wolfram notes, "It
seems defensible, in the absence of a better method of cost spreading, to
distribute the cost of supplying that legal service among the class of clients who otherwise would find it difficult or impossible to finance legal
'164
services on a non-contingent basis.
4. Contingency Fees Increase Frivolous Litigation
Frivolous claims involve "unmeritorious cases brought with the intention of securing settlement from the defendant since the defendant's unrecoverable lawyer fees could run higher than the amount the plaintiff
will accept to settle the case."'1 65 Some commentators argue that, under a
contingent fee system, lawyers can use the proceeds from large recoveries
to take a gamble on a greater number of such frivolous cases, 166 which all
have a chance of being profitable. 167 The reason these cases have a
chance to be successful is the pressure that the plaintiff's attorney puts on
the defendant to settle. 168 As indicated by one commentator, "the percentage contingent fee system offers lawyers the most tempting incentive
to initiate cases for their settlement value, clogging the legal system with
litigation and resulting in costly delays for society.' 69 Furthermore, if
defendant companies are being forced to settle these unmeritorious
claims, the longterm result is increased consumer costs 170 which affectthe
163. Drummonds, supra note 22, at 874.
164. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 528.
165. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 139, 150 (1984).
166. The ethics of this practice are sharply disputed. Seemingly this kind of conduct
violates the attorney's fiduciary duty to the client to zealously represent that client's
interest.
167. Aranson, supra note 20, at 761-62. Aranson used an Agent Orange case as an
illustration of this problem. Id. at 763. Although the judge found "no factual connection
... between the disease and the alleged cause," the defendants settled for $180 million
which amounted to a fee of $26 million. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 762.
170. New York City paid an estimated $270 million in liability judgments and settlements in 1993, and nationwide cities and counties collectively spent nearly $9 billion on
litigation costs. Budianski et al., supra note 2, at 5053, 5056.
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impoverished the most. This is ironic, given that the rationale many cite
for the use of the contingency fee is the benefit to the poor.
There is some empirical support for the allegation that contingency fees
increase the number of frivolous claims filed. One study found that more
than 80% of malpractice claims filed in New York against doctors are
without merit.1 71 Commentators also point to the fact that although automobile safety has increased, bodily injury claims resulting from car acci172
dents have continued to rise.
Plaintiffs' attorneys, however, argue that this is a gross exaggeration
because lawyers are rational people who will not spend their time on
cases that will obviously generate no revenue or have just a slight chance
of producing a return. 173 One personal injury attorney insisted that
"[l]awyers will not invest hundreds of hours and thousands of dollars in
1 74
cost unless they are convinced that a client's case has merit."'
In fact, Corboy argues that there is actually less of a chance of frivolous
suits being filed under a contingent fee system.175 In his view, the lawyer
acts as a buffer between the plaintiff and defendant by not accepting
baseless claims because it is not in her own economic best interest to do
S0.176

Corboy notes,

[T]he purpose of the contingent fee is... to make the parties equal
to the extent possible, for the limited purpose of judging the case. If
the defendant decides that the economics of the situation favor settlement, his action should be recognized
as the business decision, un77
affected by moral considerations.'
Corboy also points out that public policy encourages settlement, and
thus, if the contingent fee does in fact encourage settlement of disputes,
178
this should be viewed as a positive aspect of the system.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that, although frivolous lawsuits
may be a problem, the scope and acceleration of the problem may well be
exaggerated in the rush to "fix" the system. The number of personal injury suits filed in the United States actually remained constant from 1975
to 1990, and it has fallen since 1990.179 The National Center for State
Courts says that "tort filings are only 10% of all civil suits."' 80 The average award in these personal injury suits is not "megabucks," but actually
around $48,000.181
171.

Id.

172. Id.

173. Corboy, supra note 11, at 27, 32. Lawyers are not "apt to encourage litigation

which has no merit, particularly where the customary fee arrangement is a contingent
one." Id. at 320. See, e.g., Baits v. Baits, 142 N.W.2d 66, 73 (Minn. 1966).
174. Mediation Alternative to Court, supra note 105, at 4G.
175. Corboy, supra note 11, at 27, 32.
176. Id. at 29.
177. Id. at 30.

178. Id.
179. Budiansky et al., supra note 2, at 5056.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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5. Contingency Fee Rates Often Do Not Correlate With Risk of Case
The one-third contingency fee has became the standard rate for personal injury attorneys in our country. This is often without any consideration as to whether there is a risk of non-recovery for the attorney. 182 This
is a problem because the contingency fee is not appropriate for every
personal injury case and client. There must be an element of risk to justify use of a contingency fee.
Over 90% of contingency fee cases settle before trial and 50% of those
that do go to trial result in a verdict for the plaintiff.' 8 3 The exorbitant
compensation a contingency fee attorney sometimes collects can hardly
be said to reflect the amount of risk involved in a claim. 84 This type of
behavior is both unethical and illegal. As stated by a prominent scholar
on contingency fees,
[C]harging a contingent fee percentage in a case involving little or no
risk, which is designed to effectively yield double or triple the lawyer's opportunity cost ...is almost certainly unethical and illegal. It
is just as unethical and illegal as a lawyer billing a client for fifty
hours when he has only worked ten hours. Charging for a risk that is
not being 8assumed
and charging for work not done are both fraudu5
lent acts.'
Absence of risk in many types of claims where contingency fees are
collected was the topic explored and recently reported on by three prominent legal scholars, Lester Brickman, Michael J. Horowitz, and Jeffrey
O'Connell, who formulated a proposal designed to eliminate excessive
fees in situations where little or no risk of recovery exists. 186 The authors
do not advocate an abolition of the contingency fee 187 or a system of
individualized judicial review 8 8 of attorney's fees. Instead, their proposal centers around the existence or nonexistence of a defendant's offer at
an early stage in the case.' 8 9 This proposal will be examined at length
later in this Comment.
6. Contingency Fees Do Not Account for a Client's Ability to Pay an
Hourly Fee
As one prominent legal scholar noted, "it must be recognized that in a
sizable percentage of contingent fee cases today the plaintiffs could probably afford to finance the litigation on an hourly basis."' 9 0 In fact, 97% of
United States lawyers accept personal injury cases without regard to the
182. Grady, supra note 120, at 24.
183. Id. at 23-24.
184. Aronson, supra note 21, at 2.
185. Lester Brickman, A Massachusetts Debacle: Gagnon v. Shoblom, 12 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1417 (1991).
186. BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 24 [hereinafter the Manhattan Proposal].
187. Id. at 13.
188. Id at 25.

189. Id. at 26.
190. Jay, supra note 27, at 815 (citing

WOLFRAM,

supra note 18).
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client's ability to pay an hourly rate. 191 Without any real contingent element to recovery of their fees, attorneys should not be able to recover
excessive fees.1 92 The conclusion is not that wealthy plaintiffs should be
denied access to the contingency system, but rather that wealthy plaintiffs
should be informed of the fact that they may be compensating an attorney for incurring a risk of non-payment that does not exist in their situation. As explained by Judge Grady:
Many personal injury plaintiffs who could afford to pay a reasonable
non-percentage fee, and would be happy to do so if the advantages
of that alternative were explained to them, are never given the opportunity to do so. They are simply told that it is customary to handle these cases on a "contingent fee" basis, with the usual
explanation that the lawyer will receive nothing in the event there is
no recovery. Emphasis is usually placed on this "contingent" aspect
of the recovof the arrangement rather than on the large 9percentage
3
ery the client is committing himself to pay.'
The American Bar Association Committee on Contingent Fees addressed the question of whether it is ethical for a lawyer to charge a contingent fee to a client who can afford to pay for the services at an hourly
rate. 194 The committee found no basis in the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct for limiting the availability of the contingent fee to clients who
otherwise could not afford litigation. 195 Members noted that such an approach ignores the high cost of present day litigation and the difficulty of
determining a cost estimate relative to the time which will be spent by an
attorney at the time a fee agreement is formed.' 96 They concluded that,
"[b]arring contingent fees for other than the impecunious would deny important benefits to97 which the 'well-to-do' as well as the poor client are
clearly entitled."'
Although the option of employing a contingent fee should not be removed from wealthy clients as a method of financing litigation, it is necessary to demonstrate that the committee's argument is flawed in two
respects. First, the high cost of modem day litigation is not being ignored. If a client is a billionaire, but the litigation would likely cost trillions, the contingent fee might still be appropriate. The point is that the
contingent fee option should be examined on a case-by-case basis with
regard to the particular claim the individual wants to pursue. Second,
although it might be difficult to estimate the amount of time likely to be
spent on a particular claim, estimation is possible. Defendants, as well as
plaintiffs, are concerned about legal costs, and thus require information
191. Gordon Crovitz, Contingency Fees and the Common Good, WALL ST. J., July 21,
1989, at A14.
192. Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the
Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 74-78 (1989).
193. Grady, supra note 120, at 25.
194. ABA Comm. on Contingent Fees, Formal Op. 389 (1994).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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about the likely costs of defending a suit. Defense counsel is generally
able to provide these estimations. The extra calculation time is necessary
for the client to make an informed choice about her billing options. As
stated by Professor Wolfram, "If a client, fully advised about the matter
by a lawyer, prefers to have the lawyer share some of the risk of loss in
return for a higher fee payment, which will be the usual tradeoff, it is
difficult to see why the rich should not have what the poor are forced by
circumstances to accept." 19 8
1II.
A.

SOLUTIONS PROPOSED

PROVIDING THE CLIENT WITH MORE INFORMATION ABOUT FEE

PAYMENT OPTIONS

Many problems with the contingency fee could be alleviated if the
plaintiff's attorney made an individual evaluation of the strengths and
weaknesses of each case and every plaintiff's financial situation. After
this evaluation, the lawyer, acting under a fiduciary duty, should inform
the client of which type of fee system would be most suitable for her
personal situation. As stated by one legal commentator,
A lawyer must always counsel the client as to the fee arrangement
that is most suitable to the client, even if such an agreement would
not maximize the attorney's economic position. An attorney must
present the client with sufficient information and advice to exercise
an informed choice about the fee agreement. 199
As discussed above, the market does not operate efficiently because
consumers do not have enough information about the pricing of legal
services. 200 William Fry, executive director of Helping to Abolish Legal
Tyranny (HALT) explains,
Often the experienced lawyer has a good idea what the case is worth
and how much time it will take. But this information is not shared
with clients .... If plaintiffs had this information they could compute
how the fee compares with the lawyer's hourly charges and bargain
201
or seek another lawyer.
In order to combat this problem, some Canadian provinces require attorneys to reduce the contingent fee contract to writing for the client, give
the client notice of their right to judicial review of the fairness of the fee,
and file the contract with the court. 20 2 The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility requires that an attorney being compensated on the basis
of a contingent fee provide the client with a written contract explaining
the method by which the fee is calculated, which stages of litigation the
specified percentage of recovery incorporates, and whether expenses are
198. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 530 (emphasis added).
199. Jay, supra note 27, at 819.
200. See generally Shuck, supra note 98, at 568.
201. Burrell, supra note 126.
202. The Contingent Fee: Disciplinary Rule, Ethical Consideration, or Free Competition?, supra note 99, at 555.
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to be deducted before or after calculation of the fee.20 3 However, supplying the client with information about judicial review and providing the
court with the basics of the attorney/client contract will produce a more
informed court and client. There has been discussion by Congress and
commentators 2 °4to adopt enhanced client education standards in the
United States.
In the recent article Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet
Without the Prince of Denmark?, legal scholar Lester Brickman suggests
the adoption of a standardized form procedure in which attorneys file
certain information with the court. 20 5 This suggestion, if adopted, would
require every attorney to generate a form that stated the lawyer's normal
hourly rate and the lawyer's estimation of what the case is worth. 20 6 This
would involve estimating the likelihood of success and the amount of recovery anticipated if a successful verdict was achieved. 20 7 The form
would be filed with the court and given to the client and reviewed before
and after resolution of the case to ensure that excessive fees were not
being charged. 20 8 Brickman has seemingly abandoned this idea for a
more expansive system of fee regulation that will be addressed at length
20 9
later in this Comment.
It is not clear why Brickman changed this approach, for there are three
key advantages to such a proposal. This standardized form would help to
educate unwary clients and enable an officer of the court to effectively
supervise contingency fees. 210 Another advantage is that it forces current
collect and
contingency fee attorneys to establish an hourly fee and 2to
11
record the amount of hours worked on each client's case.
Finally, this alternative has the advantage of not being a radical overhaul of our current system. As noted, contingent fee attorneys are currently required, under the Model Rules, to disclose the following to their
clients in writing: (1) the rate of the fee; (2) the method by which the fee
is to be determined; (3) what stages of litigation the fee covers; and (4)
203. THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(c) (Discussion Draft
1983).
204. 141 CONG. REC. S5638-03 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1995).
205. Brickman, supra note 192, at 115-16.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See discussion infra part C.
210. Brickman, supra note 192, at 120.
211. This, however, is not regarded as a positive feature of any system of reform by
some attorneys. In a recent Senate debate Senator Ernest Hollings explained,
I really object to bringing it back to billable hours because we have to work
and represent clients. I am not in Michigan in one of these large law firms.
We are in a relatively small town... Here we have regulatory reform. Now
they have regulations here about actual fee per hour charged. We will have
to hire someone to keep track of this thing because I have work to do,.... I
would rather just put it on a contingent basis trying my best to get it to trial
and get it to a conclusion, and not be into the proposition of the actual fee
per hour charged and trying to compute it.
141 CONG. REC. S5638-03, S5655 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
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whether expenses will be deducted before or after calculation of the contingent fee. 21 2 Under the Canadian plan, all that would be required of an
attorney in excess of the existing ABA requirements would be to file the
contract with the court and to give the client notice of her right to appeal
its calculation. 21 3 The Brickman proposal would, however, require attorneys to calculate their hourly fees and give the client some estimation of
the likelihood of success and amount of recovery. 2 14 Of course most contingent fee attorneys would object to having to keep such records 21 5 and
give such estimations, but these requirements do not radically change the
current contingency fee system. Given that the contingency fee has operated in this country for over fifty years with few consumer complaints, we
should take small steps to improve the status quo.2 16 Radical changes,
such as the Manhattan Proposal, 21 7 should be examined with caution
while measures such as providing the client and court with more information about legal fees should be embraced. 218
Furthermore, providing the client with more information about the fee
system is not nearly as controversial as placing caps on contingency fees.
As one consumer rights group representative stated, "We are in favor of
empowering the consumer with better disclosure of fees and the fee structure and sanctioning attorneys who do not act in the best interest of their
clients. We are also in favor of better explanation of bills and their contents. ' '21 9 In a recent Senate debate, Senator Ernest "Fritz" Hollings, 220 a
long time plaintiffs' attorney, also expressed his support for providing clients with more information about fee payment when he stated, "There is
nothing wrong with disclosure. Like I say, I disclose. I want a clear understanding. I cannot represent a client fully fairly unless there is abso1
lute trust. ''22
Senator Hollings' statement was made during a Senate debate over an
amendment which would require attorneys to disclose in writing to the
client both the actual services provided and the hours spent to perform
212. THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(c) (Discussion Draft

1983).

213. The Contingent Fee: Disciplinary Rule, Ethical Consideration,or Free Competition?, supra note 99.
214. Brickman, supra note 192, at 120.

215. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S5638-03, S5655 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Hollings).
216. As Barry Nace, president of Association of Trial Lawyers of American notes, "We
should all be asking why the Manhattan Institute (and The Bee) feels compelled to change
contingency fee practice when consumers do not. Part of the answer, we believe, is that the
institute is funded by insurance, chemical, pharmaceutical and tobacco companies." Letter
from Douglas K. deVries, President, California Trial Lawyers Association, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Mar. 27, 1994, at FO5.
217. See discussion infra part C.
218. See generally Ruckle, supra note 50, at 01A.
219. Richard Vuernick, Congressional Testimony before Senate Judiciary Committee
on Contingency Fee Agreements (Nov. 7, 1995).
220. Hollings is a democratic Senator from South Carolina.
221. 141 CONG. REC. S5638-03, S5655 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hollings).
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the task. 222 This amendment eventually passed in the Senate and will be
22 3
discussed at length later in this Comment.

B.

JUDICIAL INTERVENTION

It has generally been recognized that it is within the judiciary's power
to discipline attorneys who charge excessive fees in the form of contin224
gency fees and to create rules regarding the use of the contingency fee.
As noted by a legal scholar, "Courts in most jurisdictions have held that
there is an inherent equitable power vested in a trial court to pass upon
the propriety of counsel fees in connection with any matter before it. ' ' 225
The trend has not been, however, to abolish the use of the contingency
fee, but simply to create limitations on the amount an attorney can
charge. 226 In fact, one appellate court went as far as to announce that
when the state public policy reflected support for the use of the contingency fee, a local court could not abolish the use of them. 227 In fact,

judges have been hesitant to interfere significantly with the calculation of
legal fees. Some believe that this deference highlights the importance
that judges, and in effect members of society, place on our freedom to
contract. Others believe that it stems from judicial respect for other
members of the Bar.
Regardless of judicial hesitance, case-by-case examination of contingency fees does not seem to be a desirable alternative given the overcrowded dockets of our courts. Professor Horowitz notes:
[C]ourts neither can nor should engage in fact finding reviews of all
contingency fee contracts to determine the nature and degree of the
risks of nonrecovery which existed when the retainer agreements
were entered into; such encompassing fact-findings would constitute
gross and promiscuous abuses of scarce judicial resources, They
would also be generally one-sided, given attorneys' highly superior
ability to know
(and build records regarding) the risks of
228
nonrecovery.
Although Horowitz has many good points, it is important to note that
selective, versus automatic, judicial review has many advantages. First, as
noted above, it is respectful of the rights of the parties to contract as they
wish. Second, it does not involve a large degree of administrative ef222. 141 CONG. REC. D515-01 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1995) (showing Abraham Amendment No. 597 adopted); 141 CONG. REC. D574-02 (daily ed. May 10, 1995) (showing Product Liability Fairness Act (H.R. 956) passed with amendments).
223. 141 CONG. REC. D515-01 (daily ed. Apr. 26,1995) (Abraham Amendment No. 597
adopted).
224. Aronson, supra note 21, at 29.
225. Note, Judicial Power Over Contingent Fee Contracts: Reasonableness and Ethics,
20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 523, 523 (1980).
226. Aronson, supra note 21, at 29.
227. Id.
228. Michael Horowitz, Making Ethics Real, Making Ethics Work: A ProposalforContingency Fee Reform, 44 EMORY L. J.173, 180 (1995).
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fort22 9 because the judge selectively reviews cases that she feels merit inspection based on the degree of the plaintiff's injury230 or the amount of
the settlement. Of course, the obvious problem with this suggestion is
that there is a lack of uniformity between jurisdictions. Like many issues,
a judge would have discretion to police contingency fees with as much
vigor as she feels necessary, which is bound to create inequities.
C.

THE MANHATrAN PROPOSAL

As mentioned earlier, three scholars addressed the problem of contingency fees in an official proposal. 2 31 The authors, a group of reformers
from the Manhattan Institute of Washington, D.C., presented the Manhattan Proposal to the American Bar Association, its state affiliates, and
state supreme courts. They urged each group to change their ethics rules
232
accordingly.
Although the Manhattan Proposal has many defense attorney supporters, plaintiffs' attorneys have also begun to jump on the bandwagon, perhaps if for no other reason than the declining perception of the Bar. One
prominent personal injury attorney, during an annual meeting of the
American Bar Association Tort and Insurance Practice Section, openly
supported the proposal. Steven Susman stated,
I do a lot of contingent fee work for large corporate plaintiffs and
during our fee negotiations, little is left on the table. Often my clients insist on a fee structure not so different from that being proposed (the Manhattan Proposal). So what's so awful with a rule that
assures clients
without clout of the same protections against a lawyer
233
windfall?
The Manhattan Proposal has also had the effect of putting the issue of
excessive contingent fees in the legislative limelight. There have been
numerous amendments attached to tort reform legislation in Congress
2 34
that would make variations of the Manhattan Proposal federal law.
Additionally, with backing from the Alliance to Revitalize California, a
contingency fee capping system was placed on the March 1996 California
235
ballot.
229. The next alternative discussed, the Manhattan Proposal, would likely require a
significant degree of supervision from some sort of regulatory commission or the courts.
230. As discussed above, one of the most common complaints about the current system
is that an especially injured plaintiff will receive a large award and her attorney will recover
a larger fee, which is not based on the amount or quality of the attorney's work. With this
in mind, judges should look more closely at the seriously injured plaintiffs to make sure
that the attorney is not capitalizing on their misfortune.
231. BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 24-28.

232. Place Some Limits on Contingency Fees, supra note 142, at B10.
233. Steven D. Susman, A Case for a Cease Fire, Address to the Annual Meeting of the
Tort and Practice Section of the ABA (Apr. 15, 1994).
234. See infra part IV.
235. Robert S. England, Ambulance ChaserAlert: Next March California Voters Hope
to Kick Off a Nationwide Movement to Rein in Lawyer's Fees, FIN. WORLD, Oct. 10, 1995,
at 28. Excepting that the California bill limits the amount an attorney can collect to 15%
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1. The Basics of the Manhattan Proposal
Under the proposed system, defendants would be given an opportunity
to make settlement offers within a sixty-day window after the request is
received from plaintiff's counsel. 236 First, if the defendant chose not to
make an offer within the sixty-day period, contingency fee contracts
would not be affected by this proposal.2 37 However, if the defendant submits an offer of settlement and the offer is accepted by the plaintiff,
"counsel fees would be limited to hourly charges and are capped at 10%
'238 If
of the first $100,000 of the offer and 5% of any greater amounts.
the plaintiff chose to reject defendants' early offer(s), contingency fees
would be limited to the amount in excess of the early offer(s). 239 The

proposal also provides for both parties to disclose "routinely discoverable
information" in order for both parties to more effectively evaluate their
claims. 240
2.

Advantages

The Manhattan Proposal is widely praised. The measure is being
pitched mostly for its ability to significantly reduce contingency fees.
However, the proposal also attempts to inject a degree of efficiency into
the civil justice system.
a.

Reduction of Contingency Fees

The authors of the Manhattan Proposal claim that, if enacted, the proposal will reduce contingency fee payments to attorneys by thirteen to
fifteen billion 24 1 dollars annually. Professor Brickman explains, "In limiting windfall fees, the proposal would facilitate early settlements and redistribute to victims and consumers large amounts of tort payments that
'2 4 2
now go to lawyers.
b.

Efficiency

Since under the Manhattan Proposal defendants have an incentive to
offer a settlement within sixty days, one advantage of the system is that it
saves time, and thus ultimately litigation costs. 243 For low or middle inof an early settlement offer instead of linking the amount due to hours worked before the
settlement, the bill appears to be a replica of the Manhattan Proposal. Id.
236. BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 27.
237. Id. at 28.

238. Id. at 27.
239. Id. at 28.
240. Id. at 27-28.
241. Id. at 40. They also predict that annual defense costs from such cases will be reduced by around sixteen billion dollars annually. Id.
242. Brickman, supra note 6, at 11A.
243. However, Richard Vuernick of Citizen Action notes that this doesn't necessarily
mean that the Manhattan Proposal would reduce health care or product liability costs significantly because the negligent defendant would still have to pay the same award. See
Richard Vuernick, Congressional Testimony before Senate Judiciary Committee on Contingency Fee Agreements (Nov. 7, 1995).
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come personal injury claimants, the Manhattan Proposal provides an appealing alternative to the current clogged courts, which may not produce
2
a verdict for several years. "
The proposal's focus on early settlement also results in earlier discovery. This has the advantage of allowing parties to more accurately ana245
lyze settlement offers.
3. Criticisms
The proposal has been heavily criticized by many for a variety of reasons. First, the proposal has been criticized for being a one-sided attack
on the problems of legal fees. Second, the proposal is being widely attacked as an effort by big business to sell their own agenda as a proconsumer measure. Finally, although the capping plan may ultimately increase the amount of a plaintiff's recovery, the proposal ignores the disincentive it creates for attorneys to take lower dollar value cases. This
inhibits the ability of a low or middle class plaintiff to obtain effective
counsel.
a.

Proposal Ignores Abusive Fee Tactics of Defense Bar

The first criticism explored is that the proposal ignores ethical violations in hourly fee schedules. Chief Justice Feldman of the Supreme
Court of Arizona summed up this argument when he stated that the proposal failed to recognize that "fee abuse is not the exclusive province of
'2 46
plaintiffs lawyers.
Justice Feldman's point is well taken. In a recent study, more than 60%
of lawyers who billed on an hourly basis said they had personal knowledge of bill padding. 247 Furthermore, auditors reviewing legal bills found
abhorrent tactics such as a lawyer who billed a client for sixty-two hours
in a single day and another who charged the client three thousand times
for the same twelve minutes of his time. 248 Incredibly, one auditor stated
that he finds over-billing in 90% of the cases that he is hired to
249
examine.
Brickman does not argue with the Chief Justice's estimation of the
problems of the defense bar, but instead he notes that the defense bar has
also criticized the proposal for its incentive to provide quick, and therefore less costly, settlements. Thus, the effect of the proposal on the defense bar is also to cut costs because the current system rewards defense
attorneys who engage in long, dragged out, paper shuffling battles.
244. BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 1,at 36-37.
245. Id. at 38.
246. Letter from Stanley G. Feldman, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Arizona, to
Michael Horowitz I (Mar. 1, 1994) (on file with the Emory Law Journal).
247. Budiansky et al., supra note 2, at 5056.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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Questionable Motives Behind Creation

The second major complaint about the Manhattan Proposal is that the
authors and supporters are insurance companies or manufacturers who
have self-servingly designed a plan that will reduce their own litigation
costs. 250 Barry Nace, President of the Association of Trial Attorneys
(ATLA) calls the Manhattan Proposal "a new line of attack with the
same goal: to prevent consumers who have been negligently injured from
going to court. '2 51 He notes that this attack is from the usual cast of big
defense firms, the Manhattan Institute, "a conservative think tank," and
the J.M. Olin Foundation,2 52 who have had no personal connection with
tort victims. 253 One personal injury attorney, writing to The Sacramento
Bee after the newspaper published a favorable article about the Manhattan Proposal, asked,
Who will benefit most if [the contingent fee] is legislated out of existence? The obvious beneficiaries are the insurance companies and
the manufacturers. It is they who are most hostile to the contingency
fee because suits brought under such agreements are the most effective curbs to the abuses they have wrought against the consumer. 254
In fact, leading financial supporters of the failed California Proposition
202, a plan that was very similar to the Manhattan Proposal, include: Intel Corporation, who donated $400,000; Seagate Technology, contributing
$136,000; Symantec Corporation, providing $200,000; Cypress Semiconductor, donating $100,000; and Adaptec Incorporated, pledging
$50,000.255
c. Limits Client's Ability to Obtain Counsel
Another criticism of the Manhattan Proposal is that it is merely an attempt by big companies to reduce the indigent's ability to obtain counsel.
In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Contingency Fee
Agreements, Richard Vuernick, Legal Policy Director, explained,
[The Contingency fee] provides access to our nation's court system
and [has] allowed ordinary Americans-regardless of their wealth or
social standing to hold even the most powerful wrongdoer accountable for harm caused by defective products, negligent doctors, and environmentally-unfriendly corporations. Our civil justice system, the
envy of the world, puts consumer health and safety in the hands of
the people, not the government or powerful corporations. Unless we
want to institute widespread government paid-legal aid programs,
the contingency fee arrangement is necessary. Simply stated, the contingency fee agreement is the poor and middle income person's ticket
250. Nace, supra note 80, at 7.
251. Id.
252. The Olin Foundation, according to Nace, produces lawyers and judges who "champion the notion that property rights should receive the same constitutional protection as
other rights." Id.
253. Id.
254. Letter from Allen Max Luger, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 27, 1994, at FO5.
255. Wilson, supra note 16, at Al.
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to justice.256
Representing Citizen Action, Mr. Vuernick explained that, although
the Manhattan Proposal seems intuitively pro-consumer, in fact, it is
not.2 57 By decreasing the incentive of counsel to take complicated cases
the
or claims that require a financial investment by plaintiff's counsel,
2 58
Manhattan Proposal limits the plaintiff's ability to obtain counsel.
Mr. Vuernick further explains,
Proposals to limit contingency fee agreements are unfair because
they only affect consumers and their attorneys. Limiting contingency
fee agreements without limiting the amount of money that corporations can spend on their defense is one-sided. Businesses will still be
able to hire the best legal defense that their money can buy, but if
limits are placed on contingency fee agreements, consumers may be
limited in their choice of counsel. Proposals which limit contingency
fees affect only one set of players in the civil justice system-consumers. Businesses sued by consumers would not be affected nor
would businesses which sue other businesses 2be59 affected because
they rarely rely on contingency fee agreements.
4.

The Future of the Manhattan Proposal

Whether the Manhattan Proposal is workable remains to be seen. Because it is such a radical departure from the status quo, there are bound
to be implementation and enforcement problems. What is clear, though,
is that the Manhattan Proposal has put the issue of excessive attorney
fees on center stage. It is time to scrutinize the inequities of the current
billing practices of both sides of the Bar. The Manhattan Proposal, at the
very least, provides a forum for such discussion.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE REFORM

A. THE SENATE
Senators Spencer Abraham and Mitch McConnell introduced an
amendment to the Commonsense Product Liability and Legal Reform

Act that involved contingent fees. 260 The amendment required an attorney to provide61a written statement within thirty days that discloses certain
2
information.
The attorney would have been required to provide the following: (1)
the estimated number of hours the attorney will spend either settling or
attempting to settle the client's case and the number of hours the attorney expects to spend if the claim should proceed to litigation; (2) the
256. Richard Vuernick, Congressional Testimony before Senate Judiciary committee on
Contingency Fee Agreements (Nov. 7, 1995) (emphasis added).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. 141 CONG. REC. S5638-03, S5653 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Abraham).
261. Id.
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basis of the attorney's fee for services (contingent, hourly, or flat fee);
and (3) the amount of the fee the attorney will charge (percentage of
recovery expected, hourly rate, or retainer amount required). 262 Furthermore, under the amendment, within thirty days after the claim has been
settled or adjudicated, the attorney shall provide the client with a written
notice of: the actual number of hours the attorney worked on the client's
case, the total amount of the fee for the attorney's services, and the actual
fee per hour (determined by dividing the total amount of the fee by the
actual number of hours the attorney worked on claim). 2 63 Finally, if the
attorney failed to disclose this information to the client, the client can
withhold up to 10% of the fee charged and can file a civil action for any
264
damages she incurred as a result of the failure to disclose.
As discussed above, there are many approaches to addressing concerns
about the contingency fee. This amendment focused less on reforming
the terms of the contingent fee itself, and instead merely provided safeguards to be employed when using the current contingency fee. The goal
of this amendment was to provide the client with more information so
that she may effectively bargain for a percentage fee that is appropriate,
given the amount of risk associated with her claim. Senator Abraham
stressed that the consumer seeking legal services is especially in need of
adequate information about fees, given that most clients have not dealt
with the legal services market before. 265 He noted, "This lack of client
experience establishes a significant information and expertise imbalance,
one that can lead to a client's receiving less favorable treatment than he
or she might obtain with better information. ' 266 This problem is exacerbated by the nature of the relationship between the typical contingency
fee client and the lawyer. Often the relationship is not ongoing, but
rather deals with a single piece of litigation, and therefore, the attorney
267
has less of an incentive to keep the client satisfied and informed.
It should be noted at the outset that most of the information that the
amendment required the attorney to provide must already be disclosed
under the ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalResponsibility.268 Therefore,
besides the penalties for non-disclosure, the most notable addition of the
amendment was the required estimation of the hours necessary and the
subsequent tabulation of hours to resolve the client's debate. Senator
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. 141 CONG. REC. S5638-03, S5653 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Abraham).
266. Id. at S5654.
267. Id.
268. An attorney contracting under a contingency fee must provide the client a written
explanation of the method used to calculate the fee, which stages of litigation would be
included within the original fee, and whether expenses are to be deducted before or after

the calculation of the contingent fee.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 1.5

(Discussion Draft 1983). Furthermore, after the matter has been disposed of the lawyer is
obligated to provide the client with a written statement of the outcome of the matter and, if
he prevailed, the amount and calculation of the remittance. Id.

1672

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Hollings strongly opposed requiring attorneys to make such a prediction
at the outset of a case and being burdened with tracking the amount of
hours worked on a client's case. 269 Senator Hollings felt that this attempt
to "bureaucratize the law practice" 270 was intrusive and unwarranted.
In the end, this amendment was passed. 271 Shortly after its adoption,
the House sent a message to the Senate indicating the members' discontent with the amendment. 2 72 A conference between the House and the
Senate to work out differences was requested by the House and agreed to
by the Senate.

B.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Perhaps the reason that the House of Representatives sent a message
to the Senate regarding the amendment they passed involves the legislation that the House itself had passed. The legislation passed in the House
was modeled after the Manhattan Proposal. Under this amendment, if a
plaintiff's attorney received written notification of an offer of settlement
within 180 days after the defendant received initial notice of the claim,
the plaintiff's attorney was limited to receiving an hourly rate for his services. 273 Furthermore, even if no qualifying settlement offer was accepted
by the plaintiff, a contingent fee could not exceed 33% minus the amount
of the settlement offer, a reasonable hourly rate, and actual expenses of
the attorney. 274 Finally, if the defendant notified the plaintiff within 180
days that he no longer contested liability, the plaintiff's attorney would be
275
limited to hourly fees.
As noted above, the two houses had a joint conference. An amendment was agreed upon. However, President Clinton vetoed the entire bill
on May 2, 1996.
C.

CALIFORNIA

In March 1996, three anti-lawyer initiatives were placed on the ballot.
Nicknamed the "terrible 200s,"276 they were sponsored by Alliance to
Revitalize California. 277 All three measures failed. 278 If they had passed,
269. 141 CONG. REC. S5638-03, S5655 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hollings) "I could comply with two and three. But I have no idea about the estimated hours
of settling or attempting to settle the claim and estimated hours of handling the claim
throughout trial. Of course, it says nothing here about the appeal." Id.
270. Id.
271. 141 CONG. REC. D515-01 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1995).
272. 141 CONG. REC. S17674-03 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995) (statement of Rep. Pressler).
273. 141 CONG. REC. H2651-03, H2652 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1995).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See No to the Terrible 200s, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Mar. 28, 1996, at A18.
277. The Alliance to Revitalize California is reportedly made up of an "unusual union
of Republican political pros, Democratic consumer activists and Silicon Valley entrepreneurs." Charles Oliver, The Golden State's Tort Wars, INVESTOR'S Bus. WKLY, Dec. 13,
1995, at Al.
278. No to the Terrible 200's, supra note 276.
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they would have drastically altered the state's civil justice system. 279 One
of the proposed measures, Proposition 202, would have capped a lawyer's
fee at 15% in suits that are settled within sixty days. 28 0 Under the measure, if the settlement offer was rejected and a final judgment was received, the lawyer would have still been limited to a mere 15% of the
amount of the initial settlement offer, plus a percentage of the excess over
282
the settlement amount. 281 The measure lost by a mere 51% margin.
California trial attorneys 28 3 strongly opposed Proposition 202 mainly
because they felt that it was designed to limit the ability of consumers to
sue businesses and drive plaintiffs' attorneys out of business. As Ralph

Nader indicated, "Make no mistake .... It's a very serious destruction of

people's fundamental rights to have their day in court. '2 4 Wayne McClean, president of Consumer Attorneys of California, added, "[T]he
contingency fee measure would discourage many personal-injury lawyers
from taking cases because the fifteen percent cap could apply to all or at

least part of the final judgment in lengthy cases .... It's a built in proviout of business. '28 5

sion to drive us
Members of Consumer Attorneys of California were so angered by
Proposition 202 that they are currently trying to get three initiatives of
their own placed on the November ballot.28 6 One of these proposals
would repeal any caps placed on contingency fees during the March election and stop the legislature from passing any future limits. 28 7 Another
initiative would institute stronger disciplinary proceedings for counsel
who file frivolous lawsuits. A third proposal would increase the number
of parties that the defrauded elderly could sue.28 8 One commentator indicates that the proposal to protect contingency fees would "even foil
judges who have been trying to control outrageous attorney fees in class
279. Id.

280. Oliver, supra note 277. The second proposal would set up a no-fault insurance
system in which victims would collect compensation for medical expenses and lost wages
from their own insurance company regardless of fault. Id. The only people that could be
sued under the measure are those who cause an accident because of drunk driving or while
committing a crime. Id. The third proposal would require the losing party in a class action
shareholder or derivatives suit to pay the winner's attorney's fees. Id. Furthermore, to
even bring a class action suit, plaintiffs would have to post a bond in the amount of the
firm's estimated legal expenses; this bond is estimated to average at least $2 million. Id.
281. Id.

282. E. Scott Reckard, Assessing the Vote, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Mar. 28, 1996,
at A04.
283. See, e.g., Christopher J. Farley, Fed Up With Lawyers, TIME, Jan. 8, 1996, at 36;
Marc Lifsher, 3 Measures, I Target: Lawyers, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Jan. 14, 1996, at
K01; Margaret A. Jacobs, Business Groups, Lawyers Face Off Over California Litigation
Reform, WALL ST.J., Jan. 15, 1996, at B3.
284. Dan Bernstein, Public's Dislike for Lawyers Seen as Fuel for Legal Reform, SACRAMENTo BEE, Oct. 8, 1995, at A3.
285. Id.
286. Jacobs, supra note 283, at B3,
287. Bernstein, supra note 284, at A3. The other proposal would also repeal any loserpays legislation that might be passed in the March election, and expands pension fund
investors ability to file and to win securities suits. Id.
288. Id.

1674

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

action suits."'2 89 In response, the Alliance to Revitalize California is placing yet another proposal on the November ballot to initiate contingency
290
fee reform.
Although the proposal lost, it will probably be telling of what will occur
at the national level: a hard fought, expensive battle, with serious consesides in the Caliquences for the losers. It has been estimated that both
291
fornia debate spent between $12 to $14 million each.
V.

CONCLUSION

There are justifiably serious concerns about the operation of the percentage contingency fees in the United States today. Although there are
massive numbers of people injured each year in accidents that require
personal injury litigation and who cannot afford hourly fee counsel, the
situation for these plaintiffs is different than that of the plaintiffs of the
past. Tort laws have changed significantly, making it easier to establish
liability; furthermore, the average amount of damages awarded to a
plaintiff has drastically increased. It is necessary that fees for legal services reflect the relatively lower amount of risk involved in today's personal injury claims. However, in the process of this reform it should not
be forgotten that, for many people, the contingency fee is the only real
way to gain access to the legal system.
Given the decreasing amount of risk present in personal injury claims,
it is incomprehensible that the average percentage contingency fee has
risen, rather than declined, in the past decades. The percentage contingency fee should reflect risk of non-payment to the attorney, either because of the nature of the claim or the financial situation of the plaintiff.
Without risk, there is no contingency, and thus no basis for a contingency
fee. Over the years there have been many suggestions for improving the
contingency fee, and many others have suggested alternatives to its use. I
have outlined what I believe to be the most workable modern responses
to the contingency fee crisis. These alternatives include: giving the client
and the court more information about the fee arrangement at all stages of
the litigation, increasing judicial regulation of attorney's fees, or adopting
the Manhattan Proposal or one of its legislatively created hybrids.
As noted, enacting legislation that improves attorney/client communication has many advantages. It actually enhances the contractual relationship because it enables the plaintiff, as a contracting party, to be
better informed of her fee payment options. If the information is shared
with the court it also provides a method for the judge to more effectively
identify abuses within the system. It also forces contingency fee attorneys
289. A.B.A. Denounces Trial Lawyers' Attempt to Gut California's Securities, Bus.

23, 1995.
290. Dan Bernstein, More Legal Reform Votes?,

WIRE, Nov.

SACREMENTO BEE,

Mar. 28, 1996, at

A16.
291. Steven A. Capps, Lawyers Spend and Win Big on 200-202 Voters Shoot Down NoFault Insurance, Reject Measures to Limit Lawsuits and Slash Lawyer Fees, SAN FRANCISCO
EXAMINER, Mar. 27, 1996, at A6.
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to establish fees and track their hours. The problem is that this might not
be enough of a change to satisfy the growing number of lawyers, scholars,
and recently, legislators, who have determined our system to be "broken"
and in need of an overhaul.
The second alternative discussed is that of enhanced judicial review of
attorney fee arrangements. As discussed, although a case-by-case analysis of fees by the judge may not be an appropriate nor accomplishable
alternative, there are definite advantages to the practice. This approach
would allow the judicial system to continue to regulate itself, and would
avoid a radical departure from the current system, which has many ardent
supporters. Again, this may not be a strong enough solution for the many
people who want our system "fixed."
Finally, the Manhattan Proposal has many advantages. In theory it will
severely restrict an attorney's ability to receive "windfall" fees when little
effort is expended. It also ties the attorney's fees more closely to the
effort expended and the risk present in a particular case, without removing the indigent's option of hiring an attorney on a contingency fee. The
problem with the proposal is that it is a radical departure from the current system. It is unclear what perverse incentives it might actually create
in practice. Any radical effects of the proposal would likely come at the
expense of the indigent.
The best alternative to the problem of abusive contingency fees is likely
a combination of the three discussed alternatives. First, there should be a
concerted effort to educate clients about fee payment options. Second,
although burdensome for the average plaintiff's attorney, records should
be kept which log the amount of hours that an attorney has worked on a
case. At the end of the case, in light of the hours the attorney has worked
on the case, the attorney, the client, and the judge should all review the
proposed fee to determine if it is excessive. Finally, a cap on contingency
fees might be appropriate in limited situations. For example, settlements
entered into within thirty days after the attorney filed the claim should be
limited. A cap of 10% to 15% might be appropriate in this situation because the attorney has not likely invested a lot of time, resources, or risk
inthe case.
Whatever combination of judicial review, information providing, and
fee capping the legislature chooses to implement, one can be sure that it
is necessary. As recently stated by Michael Horowitz while testifying
before the House, "The 104th Congress' ability to significantly reform our
civil justice system may in large measure determine America's continuing
2 92
faith and belief in the rule of law itself."

292. Michael Horowitz, Statement before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property House Judiciary Committee (Feb. 10, 1995).

